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  European integration has progressed in two stages. The goal of the first, from the 1957 Rome 
Treaties until the early 1980s, was to build a "common market" compatible with EC/EU national 
models of economic development. National social policy and industrial relations systems remained at 
the heart of national sovereignty during this stage.  In consequence, little transnational trade unionism 
and social policy came into being. The situation meant that trade unionism became ever more firmly 
nationalized.1 The major goal of the second stage, which began in the 1980s, was to build a "single 
market" out of national markets earlier interconnected by the common market. Single market policies 
had very different implications for matters of industrial relations and social policy. Whether and how 
these implications have brought "spillover" towards the Europeanization of industrial relations and 
social policies and the consolidation of transnational unionism at European level are the questions this 
paper will ask.  
  From its beginning European integration has been largely about controlling economic 
internationalization. 2  Over time, and particularly recently,  EC/EU member states have sacrificed 
important dimensions of their policy autonomy to a new "Europe."  Integrating Europe has involved 
much more market building than market correcting,  however. More often than not pieces of national 
sovereignty have been "marketized" at European level rather than  transferred to  Eurolevel institutions. 
European institutions have acquired no significant fiscal powers, for example. The proposed Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) will constrain everyone to rigid price stability without recourse to residual 
domestic tools. In particular, the policy levers that once allowed European nations to prioritize full 
employment have been lost.  
  The new single market was certain to impact differentially on key producer groups. Capital was 
encouraged to "Europeanize" further and use the EC/EU as a staging area for action on the world scene. 
Moreover, it was quite obviously in the interests of capital to let the single market undermine national 
union movements, thereby gaining more of the labor market flexibility that firms desired. Moreover, 
the European political system was constructed such that it was easier to block the Europeanization of 
new policy areas than to promote it. This was particularly true in industrial relations and social policy 
where  EC/EU member states only reluctantly and very selectively allowed pooling of sovereignty. 
Europe's institutional setting also made European processes more open to poweful interests desirous of 
stopping regulatory action than to those hoping to promote.3   It seemed, therefore, that any likelihood 
of new Euro-level unionism and social regulation became even less likely in the single market because 
business, whose power was growing for other reasons, would have large resources to block it.  
  Unions faced a more threatening context. The prerogatives that nation states retained to protect 
workers, consolidated in a period when governments had great control over the parameters of 
economic policy,  were becoming too weak to counteract the loss of these parameters to Europe.  
Unions found themselves, particularly after 1985, in a difficult strategic dilemma. As organizations  
they had spent nearly a century enracinating themselves in their national setting . Their traditional tools 
and discourses were profoundly national. Yet the globalization of economic flows, including that 
contrived politically through European integration, made these traditional tools ever less effective. The 
most apparent result nearly everywhere was a relative decline in the power of unions.  To counteract 
this decline unions had to decide where to focus their action.  They were certain to focus dwindling 
resources where they might make the biggest difference, at national level.  This was because of tradition, habit and dense institutional networks, to be sure, but also because, given the nature of the 
EC/EU's treaty-constitution, national governments had the largest portion of political power at 
European level.  Thus while it might have made sense, in the abstract, for European unions to invest in 
building new forms of transnational unionism to counteract transnational capitalism, concretely they 
were much more likely to hunker down to fight at national level.  
  The mid-1980s political decisions to regenerate European integration were thus likely to erode the 
national resource bases of European union movements without compensation, other things being equal, 
enhancing labor's already apparent downward spiral at national level.  This paper will tell a different 
story, however.  By 1995 EC/EU  processes had promoted a European trade union movement of some 
weight and consistency along with the tentative beginnings of a European system of industrial relations. 
These accomplishments have flowed only partially from the "spillover" dear to "functionalist" theorists 
of European integration. For the most part they have been produced by political work by actors in the 
European system. 
  The lead in pushing the "1992" program was taken by the European Commission. And the 
particular Commissions in Brussels after 1985 were led by President, Jacques Delors, who had once 
been a trade unionist and who had a record for promoting negotiated industrial relations practices in his 
native France. The Delors Commissions were thus certain to be aware of the likely consequences for 
national social and industrial relations regimes of the "1992" policies and might well use what 
resources they had to preempt the dangers they foresaw.  The Commission had its own interests in 
involving both labor and capital more deeply in European social integration. One of Jacques Delors' 
favorite lines was that new European integration would provide better foundations for a "European 
model of society" where the harshness of markets was limited by humane policies and contractual 
negotiation of social solidarity. Beyond such lofty purposes, promoting policies that would make the 
"social partners" more committed to integration was also a way of garnering new political support for 
the Commission itself which might then be used to influence a European political system with strong 
tendencies towards intergovernmentalism.4 Thirdly,  Europe, as opposed to European nations, lacked a 
genuine mass political culture. Without transnational actors with stakes in European outcomes beyond 
the national governments which traditionally manipulated the intersection between EC/EU and 
national polities to their advantage, it would be difficult to create such a culture.  
  The Single Market program would change the settings faced by capital and  labor. On their own 
the "social partners" were likely to evaluate these changes and choose paths of action which would 
negate Euro-level progress. The Commission's only option was to intervene politically to change the 
nature of the debate What occurred,  in fact, was the development of a Commission strategy  to create 
"path dependent" matrices of choice to move the social partners towards such Commission goals.  It 
would do so, short step by short step, by proposing policy that could lead labor and capital to see their 
own goals in more European ways. Thus in the relatively  modest ways we are about to outline, some 
new Europeanization actually did happen.  
  Part One of this paper, after reviewing the general policy legacies of European integration in the 
social and industrial relations policy areas, will reconstruct the Commission's efforts to create this path 
dependence towards greater Europeanization. Since success at these complex maneuvers was 
contingent in the first instance upon providing incentives to European trade unionism to take the 
EC/EU more seriously, Part Two will survey the new movement towards transnational union action 
which occurred.  Part Three will review the tentative industrial relations results of this in some detail.  
 
I. Europe and Social Matters        
 
  The setting for European integration, in the wake of World War II, was characterized by talk about 
"nevermore war amongst us," Marshall Plan urging toward new European economic cooperation, and, 
above all, the Cold War. The strategists of integration came to believe that  transnational unity of 
purpose could best be created by concentrating on specific areas.5 After some trial and error6, they 
chose the trade-market area.7 Although the 1957 Rome treaty talked about many things, the new 
common market zeroed in on three central matters, creating a customs free zone, a common external 
tariff, and a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).8 The Community thus began as a narrowly trade-
oriented adventure. Its originators hoped, however, that once Europe had begun to cooperate on trade-
market matters, the policy interdependence between these and other areas would promote "spillover,"9 
hopes partly nourished by deliberately built tension between the EC/EU's original mandate and the institutions set up to implement it. The European Commission in particular was endowed, in theory, 
with capacities to promote a broadening of the EC/EU mandate. 
 
The Two Stages  
 
  The first Commissions took this endowment so seriously that the member states reacted against 
them. The decisive intervention of General de Gaulle in the mid-1960s, made just as the new 
Commission began to flex its muscles, stopped things cold.10 The outcome was the "Luxembourg 
Compromise" (1966) which would govern EC/EU institutional life into the mid-1980s.11 The Rome 
Treaty had foreseen flexibility in Council decision making, including majority voting in the Council of 
Ministers. But from "Luxembourg" onwards each EC/EU member could invoke "national interest" on 
matters which it regarded as essential. This implied unanimity on all controversial issues. For the next 
two decades the common market was an intergovernmental operation. General de Gaulle, despite his 
strident gallo-centrism, spoke for other EC/EU member states. The EC/EU had reached a post-war 
boom equilibrium. European national economies thrived within a Keynesian-welfare state framework 
as they entered the consumerist era. The EC/EU's customs-free zone and common exernal tariff gave 
them the space needed to regulate themselves, strike viable domestic political deals and trade with one 
another while being reasonably well insulated from the outside world, particularly the US.    
  In the early 1970s, after the first, "Common Market" phase of implementing the Rome Treaty, 
there was a brief rekindling of energies. Plans were set out to "widen" EC/EU by including the British, 
Danish, Irish and Norwegians, and "deepen" by giving the Community larger budgetary powers, new 
foreign policy coordination (in European Political Cooperation), and movement to Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). Enlargement occurred in 1973  (without the Norwegians)12 and the 
Community acquired its own limited sources of revenue. But broader ambitions in EMU, regional and 
social policies were frustrated.  
  The deep causes of this lay in changing economic circumstances. The oft-told tales  of European 
stagflation after the first oil shock in 1973 - high inflation  which employment-destroying deflation 
could not root out - provides necessary background. Productivity, profit margins, and investment levels 
declined while European industry began to lose competitive advantage.  In response to a worsening 
economic situation, EC/EU member states retreated in dispersed order towards particular national 
solutions, leading to growing divergence of economic policies and growing disparity among EC/EU 
economies. Growth levels fell to half what they had been in the 1960s, international trade expanded 
less, while intra-EC/EU trade expansion actually stopped. 
  In this context the EC/EU began a downward spiral while the EC/EU institutional system came to 
a standstill. The European action that did occur, emanating intergovernmental, not supranational, 
sources, largely involved new coping mechanisms. The European Monetary System, evolving out of 
the failed "snake" of the early 1970s, was a Franco-German effort to limit damage from the collapse 
pse of the Bretton Woods system and changed US outlooks about the the international monetary 
system. The European Council, periodic summits of heads of state and governments to coordinate 
general policy lines in the newly difficult period, was another such product. 
  Social policy was one of the neglected dimensions of European integration in this first stage. The 
social provisions of the 1958 Rome Treaty were limited.13  Issues of employment and remuneration 
were considered national in essence, excepting only equal pay compensation between men and women 
enshrined in Article 119 of the treaty.14 Free mobility of labor had to be a counterpart to free 
movement of goods and capital, and this led, in time, to a small body of rules governing workers' rights 
to move across EC/EU territory, residence, and equal treatment concerning hiring and firing, 
remuneration and other conditions of work.15 The treaty enjoined national social security program 
differences from limiting worker mobility, leading to the first social legislation (in 1958) and litigation 
through the ECJ.16 The major "social" clause was Article 118, which spoke of the need "to promote 
improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for the workers," but established no 
instrument beyond the "functioning of the common market" for so doing. Moreover, the Commission 
acquired little power beyond "cooperating" with the member states by "conducting studies, issuing 
opinions, and organizing consultations."17 None of this mattered unduly in a period marked by the 
overriding concern to produce jobs via expanding trade and economic growth. Broad matters of "social 
citizenship" remained the responsibility of individual member states. The Common Market thus grew in coexistence with as wide a variety of social policy and industrial relations regimes as it had 
members.   
  Social matters were nonetheless part of the brief renewal of interest in integration in the early 
1970s. Preliminary guidelines for a "Community social policy program" were set out in 1971 followed, 
ultimately, by a Social Action program in 197418 in which member states pledged to adopt extensive 
measures over three years.19  The burst of new activity was brief.20 Economic difficulties and rising 
unemployment stimulated new preoccupation with national economic policies and resistance to 
European solutions. Growing pains  from the expansion of the Six to Nine in 1973 led to chronic 
budgetary conflicts paralyzing Community decision-making. National governments increasingly 
subverted those measures which had been adopted while very few new social measures got through the 
Council of Ministers.21 Proposals for workers' participation (the Vredeling Directive of 1980) were 
stopped, as well as a number of regulations on working time (on part time and temporary work in the 
early 1980s).22 
  After the period of "eurosclerosis," generally regarded as the low point of EC/EU history, 
European integration was renewed in the mid-1980s. The first cause of this was that the diplomatic 
context changed. Member state turned toward closer economic policy convergence and renewed 
commitment to European solutions to deep economic problems.23  Because of this there was new 
space for the European Commission to play its accelerator role. The appointment of a new 
Commission in January, 1985, led by President Jacqus Delors, brought political entrepreneurs to use 
this new space. The new Delors Commission  quickly devised the June, 1985 White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market as a tool to relaunch European integration. The "1992 program" turned 
out to be an agenda-setting coup.  The White Paper fell into the traditional EC/EU's trade-market core, 
tapped deep sources of Community legitimacy and played to the political neo-liberalism of the moment.  
  Member states quickly renegotiated parts of the Rome Treaty to implement the new program, 
eventuating in the Single European Act (SEA, signed in 1986, ratified in 1987).24 The SEA linked 
"1992" to a change in EC decision-making procedures,  so that the Luxembourg compromise gave way 
to decisions by "qualified majority" for most White Paper areas.25 Henceforth on single market issues 
member states might have to accept legislation they did not desire. Finally, the Commission advanced 
an extended list of EC "competences" - new areas in which the Community acquired a legal basis to 
act - in research and development, the environment, foreign policy cooperation and "economic and 
social cohesion" (regional policy). 
  The SEA was not an obvious great leap forward towards new EC social policy activity. The 
preservation of unanimity rules over most social and labor law innovations gave member states the 
power to veto large innovations. There were a few new openings, however. The SEA allowed qualified 
majority on directives on health and safety issues (in a new Article 118a) because health and safety 
regulations might be used as non-tariff barriers to competition.26 Next, the Community's and 
Commission's new commitments to economic and social cohesion in Article 130A provided substantial 
new opernings for regional development policy. Finally, in a new Article 118b Commission promotion 
of "social dialogue" between capital and labor at European level was encouraged.27 And the European 
Parliament's new "cooperation" powers over Single Market legislation were more than footnotes, since 
the Parliament's Social Democrat-Christian Democrat majority would become a major public advocate 
and lobbyist for a larger EC social policy role. 
 
Social Policy and "Social Partners" 
 
  The public and political success of "1992" was very great,28 enhancing the stature of the 
European Commission and allowing it to undertake an ever broadening entrepreneurial role. The new 
political capital it accumulated was very quickly reinvested following what Delors and his staff called 
a "Russian Doll" strategy.29 The Commission hoped that rapid movement towards completing the 
internal market would raise new concerns about connected issues, including social policy, making new 
initiatives possible. In this logic, however, that social and industrial relations policy matters had a 
relatively low priority.   
  "Market building" took precedence over "market correcting." It was essential to make sure that the 
"1992" program was implemented legislatively and financially. This led the Commission, after 
ratification of the SEA in 1987, to propose the first Delors budgetary package. In its tripartite 
complexity  it involved getting enough new money from member states to make the Single Market happen in ways that would limit intergovernmental financial squabbling, mild reforms to the CAP and 
"reform of the structural funds."  This last dimension was an important new step towards subsidizing 
modernization in backward regions to remove the temptations of low wage cost development strategies 
and social dumping.30  The next "doll" was Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), placed on the 
table (at French urging) immediately in 1988 after the Delors package was finally passed. The idea of 
pooling monetary and economic policy sovereignty was a huge step towards full European integration 
probably necessitated by the existence of a genuine Single Market. It was certain to bring controversy 
among member states and difficult negotiations. Jacques Delors himself undertook the task of 
structuring debate through a Committee of central bankers and economists that he chaired which 
produced the "Delors Report" in 1989. The proposals that resulted became the negotiating papers on 
EMU at Maastricht in 1991. 
  Only after the initiation of these two programs did the Commission turn towards serious "market 
correcting." The 1989 Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers was the centerpiece of 
the Delors Commissions' new social policy program. The Social Charter, which drew on policy 
legacies from the 1970s and early 1980s, was first broached in 1987 under the Belgian EC/EU 
Presidency.31   Delors then advertised the idea of a bill of social rights to the 1988 Stockholm 
Conference of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), implying that these rights should be 
enforceable.32 The Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) and the European Parliament next 
debated the question of an enforceable bill of social rights for citizens, and not only workers33 while 
the Commission simultaneously worked on a its own program (announced in the "Marin Report" - after 
EC/EU Commissioner Manuel Marin).34  
  The Commission's ideas turned out to be much less grandiose than labor and others had hoped. 
The Social Charter of May, 1989 was a "solemn commitment" on the part of member states - only 
eleven, given furious British opposition - to a set of "fundamental social rights" for workers. The list of 
30 items listed included rights to freedom of movement, employment and remuneration, improvement 
of living and working conditions, freedom of association and collective bargaining, vocational training, 
equal treatment for men and women (including measures to enable men and women to reconcile 
occupational and family obligations), information, consultation and participation for workers, 
workplace health and safety,  protection of children and adolescents, and the rights of the elderly and 
the disabled. Every worker was to have a right to adequate social security and those without 
subsistence because of inability to participate in the labor market should have sufficient resources, 
although only "according to arrangements applying each country." However, the Charter's bottom line 
was that action would occur only in those areas where a case could be made that the EC/EU's existing 
treaty base allowed European initiatives.35 The followup to the Charter was an Action Program, dated 
November 24, 1989, listed a range of measures to be proposed by the Commission within the areas 
where the Community was constitutionally empowered to act.36  Delors himself was initially skeptical 
about the Action Program, fearing, as it turned out quite correctly, that much of the legislation would 
not get through the Council of Ministers. Jean Degimbe, the Director-General of the Commission's 
social policy division (DG V) and Patrick Venturini, Delors' social policy advisor, were the major 
advocates in overcoming the Commission President's resistance. 
  Ultimately, by January 1, 1993 47 different instruments would be prepared and submitted to the 
Council of Ministers.37  Of the nine most juridically and politically contentious legislative proposals 
presented in Table 1 three were meant to regulate "atypical"  (part-time and short contract) work, and 
only one passed the Council.38 A directive on Working Time proposing minimum rest time and a 
maximum regular work week, limiting night and shift hours and imposing new health and safety rules 
upon employers passed in watered down form. Another directive on "pregnant women" to prevent 
firing, stipulate minimum levels of remuneration for maternity leave and protect health and safety 
during pregnancy also passed in somewhat diminished form. The Council approved obligating 
employers to inform employees of the conditions of their employment contract.39 A directive was also 
quickly passed updating an earlier 1975 measure on collective layoffs (plant closures) and dealt with 
employer obligations to provide timely information of a certain kind about such matters, including 
transnational information. Next came a directive, still on the table in 1995, covering the employment 
and working conditions of workers "posted"  temporarily in another country in the context of 
"provision of services."40  Finally, perhaps the most significant proposal involved establishment of 
"European Works Councils" in transnational firms, to which we will return.      
    Table 1: The Most Important Social Action Program Measures  Proposal ³Introductory  Date  ³Result 
 ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Atypical  Work 1 - Working  ³June 1990  ³none 
conditions ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Atypical  Work 2 -  ³June 1990  ³none 
Distorsion of Competition  ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Atypical Work 3 -  ³June 1990  ³Adopted June, 1991 
Health and Safety (qualified  ³  ³(91\383\EEC) 
majority) ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Working Time  ³September 1990 ³Adopted  November 1993 
(qualified majority)  ³  ³(93\104\EEC) 
 ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Pregnant Workers  ³November 1990 ³Adopted November 1992 
(qualified majority)  ³  ³(92\85\EEC) 
 ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
European Works Councils in   ³February 1991  ³Adopted September 1994 
Transnational Corporations  ³  ³(94\45\EEC) 
 ³  ³ 
 ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Explicit Employment Contract ³January 1991  ³Adopted October 1991  
 ³  ³(91\533\EEC) 
 ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Regulating cross-border  ³August 1991  ³none 
detachment of workers  ³  ³ 
providing services  ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Updating of 1975 directive  ³October 1991  ³Adopted August 1992 
about collective layoffs  ³  ³(92\56\EEC) 
 
  Source: Annex 3 of  EC Commission, Green Paper on European Social Policy (Brussels:EC, 1994) 
 
  Major action program legislation was limited in scope. Moreover, only proposals whose treaty 
base was Article 118a (health and safety- voted by qualified majority) or Article 119 (equal treatment) 
had much of a chance of getting through Council. Of the bulk of those remaining some brought little 
new (often updating existing instruments), or involved health and safety matters (nine further 
directives, plus other measures, presented in Table 2)) or were targeted on specific groups (a directive 
on access for the handicapped, one on protecting young workers plus a number of reports and 
recommandations).41  Moreover, it was usually the case that intergovernmental bargaining about 
potentially passable measures weakened the impact of those measures that were passed. In general, excepting health and safety measures, which rapidly became a strong grid of transnational regulations, 
the added regulatory value to what existed before produced by the Social Charter and Action Program 
was modest.42 
  Table 2: Health and Safety Directives Proposed under the Action Program  
Directive ³Date  Proposed ³Result 
 ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Minimum Standards at  ³August 1990  ³Adopted June 1992 
Temporary or Mobile ³  ³(92\57\EEC) 
Workplaces ³  ³ 
 ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Minimum Standards for  ³February 1991  ³Adopted June 1991 
Workplace Signage (H+S ³  ³(92\52\EEC) 
warnings) ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Minimum Standards in  ³February 1991  ³Adopted November 1991 
Extractive Industries- Drilling  ³  ³(92\91\EEC) 
 ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Minimum Standards in  ³March 1992  ³Adopted December 1992 
Extractive Industries- Mining  ³  ³(92\104\EEC) 
 ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Protection Against Asbestos  ³June 1990  ³Adopted July 1991 
 ³  ³(91\382\EEC) 
 ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Minimal Standards of Medical ³July 1990  ³Adopted April 1992 
Care Aboard Ships  ³  ³(92\29\EEC) 
 ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Minimal H+S Standards on  ³December 1991  ³pending 
Fishing Boats  ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Minimum H+S Standards in  ³January 1993  ³pending 
Transportation ³ ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Minimum H+S Standards  ³March 1993  ³Pending 
Concerning Physical Agents  ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Minmum H+S Standards  ³May, 1992  ³Pending 
Concerning Chemical Agents  ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
Proposal to Create a European ³October 1991  ³Pending Hygiene Health and Safety  ³  ³ 
Agency ³  ³ 
 
  Source: Annex 3 of  EC Commission, Green Paper on European Social Policy (Brussels:EC 1993). 
  
  The Commission's new social policy activism had additional goals. It was important to mobilize 
political resources for the Commission itself and the "social dimension" was meant to calm some of the 
fears which the Single Market aroused in the European labor movement and, in the process, to help the 
Commission acquire labor support for its strategies. Moreover, to the degree to which EC/EU action 
failed to fulfill the early promise of the Social Charter, the Commission might then count on a 
substantial mobilization of indignant voices (including the Socialist and Christian Democratic blocs 
that dominated the European Parliament) to spread the message about "Social Europe" far and wide in 
the media and the member states. But perhaps the most important goal for the future was to create 
growing public pressure for a future change in the European agenda to allow greater Community 
activism in social policy.  This, in turn, would ultimately  be helpful when the time came to propose 
changing the Treaty.43  
  The flurry of Social Charter action did not stand alone. The SEA had also included a new Article 
118B stating that "the Commission shall endeavour to develop the dialogue between management and 
labour at European level which could, if the two sides consider it desirable, lead to relations based on 
agreement." The launching of "social dialogue," Delors' first social policy step, in January, 1985 
predated this.44 Delors, who personally presided major social dialogue occasions, was a devoted 
promoter of confidence-building discussions of the social dialogue kind and had a long record in the 
area in France. Jean Degimbe, the General Director of the Commission's DG V (Social Affairs) who 
played a central role in institutionalizing social dialogue, came out of  a Belgian social policy 
environment where constant discussion occurred. Both believed that over time social dialogue would 
lead the leaders of labor and capital to develop new trust in each other. Whatever the immediate 
achievements, eventually this new trust could help transform the actors themselves into agents with the 
will and power power to deal with one another. 
  As of 1985 there was considerable distance to travel. The initial "Val Duchesse" discussions 
among UNICE (the Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of Europe), the European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC), and the public sector employers' association (CEEP, the Confederation 
Européenne des Employeurs Publics), began conflictually and did not get very far. The slim production 
was mainly "common opinions" about new technologies and about macroeconomic policy.45  Neither 
the ETUC nor UNICE, both essentially Brussels lobbies based upon confederated national 
organizations that were themselves built upon sectoral organizations, were formally empowered to 
negotiate. This kind of organizational constraint was not a particular problem for UNICE because its 
declared central objective was to avoid European level regulation and bargaining.46 On the union side 
the problem was more complicated. ETUC wanted Euro-level regulation through legislation. But like 
UNICE, it was also a - quite weak - organization of national Confederations. Since two of its most 
important constituent organizations, the German DGB and the British TUC, themselves had no 
statutory capacity to negotiate it was quite difficult to imagine ETUC itself officially bargaining, even 
though a breakthrough to European-level bargaining on important matters would have been a 
tremendous victory for labor. 
  After fizzling very quickly after 1985 social dialogue was launched again in 1989 in a new  
context of Social Charter élan.  A  new "steering group" (supplemented by a smaller "Ad hoc" group) 
was convened to talk about education, training and the evolution of the EC/EU labor market. It would 
also be consulted about forthcoming legislation. Discussions revealed the same contradictory purposes 
as earlier. UNICE was willing to talk far into the night, but its  major goal was to frustrate the 
Commission's legislative goals and prevent any possible bargaining from occurring..47 ETUC, in 
contrast, wanted as much concrete EC/EU legislation as could be generated and was willing to 
welcome real bargaining in the right circumstances. This made for frustrating general discussion which 
reached few conclusions. 
  By 1990, however, the strategic setting had begun to change. The EC/EU's decision-making 
powers were growing apace as a result of the single market program and as they did interest groups, 
even those like labor most bound to the nation state and capital which wanted Europe to stay out of 
industrial relations areas, had to make adjustments. The Commission's own efforts to prod these adjustments forward was probably more important, however. With the Social Action Program it 
opened an extensive campaign to provide incentives (favorable Eurolevel  policies, regulations and 
support) that might seduce and/or constrain the social partners to Europeanize further, perhaps even to 
bargain on important issues at European level. 
 
II. European Institutions Help Change the ETUC  
 
  Developing strategy and tactics to get Euro-level social partners talking to one another in serious 
ways was not a simple matter. To begin with, the campaign had to be assymetrical. UNICE's major 
reason for existing was to block serious European-level industrial relations action, whether legislative 
or negotiated. Thus the Commission sought first to to strengthen and encourage ETUC and national 
union movements to become stronger European actors. Delors had taken the lead in this, first of all in 
his speech to the ETUC Congress in Stockholm in 1988 (when the Social Charter was previewed).48  
His speech to the British TUC's Bournemouth Conference later in the same year presenting pro-
Europeanism to a British trade union movement theretofore profoundly antipathetic to it, was another 
step. Bournemouth killed two birds with one stone by giving the TUC a new set of issues to use against 
the British government (perhaps to cause new trouble for Prime Minister Thatcher) and by thereby 
showing the TUC the utility of pro-EC/EU positions, prodding a major constituent of the ETUC to new 
European commitments. Beyond such public events, Delors went out of his way to take unionists 
seriously in private. 
  Commission micro-level actions were quite as important.  The Commission (mainly the Delors' 
staff and DG V) systematically encouraged ETUC to take itself more seriously, and, in consequence, 
be taken more seriously by its own constituents and by employers. It thus funded the bulk of ETUC 
research on health and safety by underwriting the establishment of the Trade Union Technical Bureau 
(TUTB), for example.49 The Commission had the space to fund a great deal of the ETUC's  internal 
educational activities under various treaty provisions. It had earlier been quite generous to the 
European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), the ETUC  research arm and had also funded an organ called 
AFETT, designed to train unionists about new technologies. In 1990 it added support of a new 
organism, the European Trade Union College, to this panoply of underwriting activities. ETUCO was 
to train unionists to confront the substance of new European level regulation.  The costs of such 
activities, although small in absolute terms, were considerable additions to the ETUC's resources. 
ETUC could therefore hire on numbers of new officials and administrators and build a larger, more 
autonomous, headquarters organization. The Commission also underwrote the considerable costs of 
trade union organizational get-togethers in Brussels and elsewhere (travel, translation) to the tune of 
several million ecu per year.  
  In and of themselves, the ways and means of handing out EC/EU money for these various 
Commission-funded ETUC activities involved new avenues of Commission contact with and influence 
over ETUC thinking. More generally, the Commission carefully opened and nourished privileged 
networks of communication between itself and ETUC. Delors himself knew many of the lead 
operatives of ETUC and was willing to devote part of his precious time to cultivating them further. His 
social affairs advisor, Patrick Venturini (a major architect of the Social Charter and Action Program) 
was a former researcher for the French CFDT who had long-standing and easy contacts with ETUC 
leaders (of whom a number were from the CFDT, including Jean Lapeyre, a key ETUC operative and 
Deputy General-Secreatary after 1991, with whom Venturini was in frequent communication by 
telephone).  Until his death in 1991 François Staedelin, another former CFDT operative, also served as 
President of the EC/EU's Economic and Social Committee, an important locus for informal cross-
national union contact. Delors and Venturini had easy contact with ECOSOC, therefore, and through it 
indirectly to ETUC.  The Director-General of DG V, Jean Degimbe, a Belgian for whom constant 
discussion between labor and capital was second nature, also courted ETUC unionists. His Director for 
Industrial Relations, Carlo Savoini, who gave out the Commission's money, was an ex-Italian unionist 
with his own wide range of union contacts.50 The Commission's general logic began with recognition 
that European-level unionism was extremely weak. It was unlikely to be substantially strengthened if 
its sources of new strength were its national constitutuents alone, however.  Using Commission and 
other resources as incentives might help a great deal, therefore.  If these incentives worked and if 
ETUC could be strengthened it might discover new self-interest in the promotion of Eurolevel 
bargaining.    The employer side of the equation was not neglected, but since UNICE and its backers would only 
develop willingness to deal under constraint, the Commission's approach had to be different. UNICE 
existed, among other reasons, to deflect any pressures towards European level labor market regulation 
and bargaining.  The Commission thus had to find ways to change UNICE's point of departure. This 
would be difficult as long as UNICE existed in a setting where unions were unable to muster their 
resources on European level and no strong reasons for reconsidering UNICE's commitment to 
blockage came into being.  Slowly, over time, it became clear  that bargaining at Euro-level had to 
made a lesser evil to UNICE.  Something more dangerous to employers had to present which would 
make them choose bargaining as a course that would be less harmful, but what?  
  One possible answer was EC/EU legislation. Here the Action Program played an important role in 
making the connection. Beginning in later 1990 the Commission produced and passed a substantial 
number of pieces of legislation on to the Council. In the process of so doing it "consulted" regularly 
with the "social partners."  While employers could anticipate that much of the legislation would never 
pass, some of it would.  Moreover, there was always the chance, once some social legislation did pass, 
that the precedents would encourage further spillover and more legislative activity. It might then be 
conceivable that a broader political dynamic could be set in motion, leading to an atmosphere in which 
interests would stand behind further legislation, the Commission would be further encouraged and 
perhaps even the treaty broadened. Given the diversity of industrial relations regimes within member 
states and UNICE's constant preaching about the need for maximum flexibility, the threat of legislation, 
even in limited areas, was a serious matter.  From its point of view, however well-designed EC/EU 
legislation might be, it was bound to be more constraining than no legislation or...a bargained 
agreement on the same matters. 
 
Pumping Up ETUC 
 
  The ETUC's adjustments to the new European setting occurred partly for "functionalist" reasons. 
The large policy changes contained in the "1992" program and other Community initiatives inevitably 
touched ETUC's national constituents who, in turn, expected new things from ETUC.  The adjustment 
process was undertaken quite as much, however, because European institutions like the Commission 
and the European Parliament tried to seduce and prod ETUC to respond.  This section will review 
ETUC responses across a range of different areas. It is important to remember first that we will be 
describing very recent processes, many if not most, open-ended.  European institutions, the 
Commission in the first instance, have clearly and consciously  tried to mobilize and shape labor 
responses to their policies. If, in retrospect, there appears to be a larger strategy in this, in fact what 
emerged was most often the product of successive short term decision-making and political contexts. 
The same is true of ETUC and union responses. Changing Europe and the tactical workings of 
European institutions created situations in which labor had to make new choices, which it did from its 
preferences of the moment. Very often both sides were also venturing onto unknown territory, unsure 
of what would happen and ahead of their respective mandates to act.  
  Two small changes which began prior to the Maastricht year of 1991, the creation of the Trade 
Union Technical Bureau (TUTB) in 1988 and the European Trade Union College (ETUCO) in 1990 
illustrate the larger pattern. For both stimuli came initially from European institutions, the Commission 
and Parliament, aimed at making the most of the space created by the SEA. And in both cases the 
ETUC's strategic and organizational repertory was enlarged by new instruments supported by these 
same institutions. The TUTB and ETUCO stories demonstrate step-by-step cooperation and exchange 
between ETUC and the Commission, each acting simultaneously in its own interests, with causal 
arrows moving in both directions and with definite consequences for larger logics . 
  The creation of TUTB was a product of new EC/EU activity in workplace health and safety. 
ETUC had lobbied for European-level preventive occupational health and safety action since the end 
of 70s,51 and its efforts intensified when the SEA made health and safety subject to qualified majority. 
52 It was thus natural for the Commission to draw on ETUC for support in the area. Article 100A of 
the SEA was designed primarily to support the single market by preventing member states from using 
technical standards, including in health and safety,  as barriers to the free movement of goods. 
Harmonization of health and safety requirements, rather than mutual recognition,  was a political 
prerequisite because mutual recognition might have involved an unacceptable lowering of national 
standards for member states with higher levels of regulation.  But creating common standards had been so painstakingly slow in earlier years (because of unanimity decision rules and the sheer volume of 
regulation) that the Community had already adopted a "new approach" to health and safety regulation 
to accelerate European standardization.  
  Under the "new approach" directives were aimed at specifying "essential requirements" that goods 
had to meet in order to be freely traded within the single market.  It was left to European 
standardization bodies (initially CEN and CENELEC) to formulate the detailed technical standards and 
also to adapt them readily to changes in technology.  While the "new approach" made harmonization 
more efficient, however, it made its legitimacy more doubtful, for CEN/CENELEC were private 
bodies (composed of national standardization bodies also typically private) dominated by the 
manufacturers. Other interested parties, such as workers or consumers,  had no voice.53  The fact that 
the standards, European or national, are "voluntary” -- binding only on the bodies’ members without 
the force of law -- did not solve the legitmacy problem either, since conformity to the standards gave 
products the presumption that they met the requirements of the directives, which obliged the member 
states to allow such products to be freely imported and sold unless they could prove that they did not in 
fact meet the directives’ requirements.54  From unions' point of view there were real problems, since 
the standards once set determined in practice how health and safety matters of concern to workers were 
settled. 
  The ETUC expressed its concerns about this often in the first years of the Delors Commissions.55  
A response culminating in the establishment of the TUTB occurred in the context of the preparation of 
two closely related directives, the Machinery Directive, under 100A, and the Framework Directive, 
under 118A, adopted within days of each other in June 1989.  The issue of union participation in 
standardization was given new urgency by the large scope of the machinery directive.56  A 1987 
ETUC survey, financed by the Commission, showed that unions had some rights but few resources for 
influencing national standardization and no role whatever at international level.57  This, plus 
discussions with affiliates, provided the basis for an ETUC demand that unions be given stronger rights 
and more resource to influence standardization at European level.  It proposed that these rights be 
exercised through a new unit within the tri-partite Advisory Committee on Health and Safety (ACSH) 
established specifically to deal with "new approach" directives.58  It also called upon the Commission 
to finance a "technical tool” to assist the workers’ group in ACSH.59  There was a debate within the 
ETUC as to whether that tool should itself be attached to the ACSH or independent to provide the 
ETUC with its own technical expertise on the range of  European health and safety issues and work 
with national affiliates.  It ultimately opted for the latter.60 
  European institutions supported the option, largely for their own reasons.  DG III, responsible for 
the internal market, was concerned with legitimating and further Europeanizing standardizing 
institutions to forward the "new approach" directives under its jurisdiction.61  ETUC’s quest for 
technical capacity fitted those objectives.  The Commission needed to mobilize support for the 
Machinery Directive in Parliament, and provision for union involvement in shaping standards would 
clearly serve that end.  The Parliamentary Committee report on the directive pointed out the unions’ 
lack of technical resources for influencing standardization and recommended that the Community 
finance such resources.  But for union involvement in European standardization to occur, CEN , as a 
private body,  had to accept it, but it was initially reluctant.62  It had earlier refused to set up a tri-
partite committee on standardization like the ACSH which DG III proposed  together with DG V’s 
health and safety unit. The DG III standarization unit accordingly backed the idea of giving ETUC its 
own technical capacity because it might overcome CEN resistance to union participation by depriving 
it of the pretext that the unions lacked the necessary competence.  Moreover, strengthening the 
capacity of the unions’ European level organization to participate in the process was expected to 
encourage the manufacturers to do the same, thereby contributing to the Europeanization of the 
process.63  
  Support for the idea also came from within DG V, shepherding what became the Framework 
Directive throught the legislative process.64  Some in DG V saw the directive as an opportunity to 
stretch further the boundaries of health and safety policy. In this, they naturally had the support of the 
ETUC, which had proposed something much more far-reaching than the initial draft of the directive, 
providing ammunition for those in DG V who wanted to go further.65   They in turn had a stake in 
making ETUC as effective as possible by equipping it with the resources needed to lobby persuasively 
and mobilize its member confederations to build support within the member states.  At the same time, 
they rejected the initial ETUC suggestion that technical support for unions be provided within ACSH on the ground that it would mean financing technical support for companies which did not need it,   
demonstrating clear Commission recognition of the imbalance in resources available to unions and 
employers . 66 
  Before either ETUC or the Commission made a formal proposal,  however, the Parliament took 
the initiative to settle the issue, accepting the recommendation of its machinery directive committee 
and establishing a line in the 1989 budget authorizing funds to give ETUC new technical competence. 
Budgetary issues such as these are among the few where Parliament has the final power of decision 
and the committee’s recommendation that it use its power this way reflected the influence of the 
Danish labor movement. 67  The vote in favor of the budget line in turn reflected the strength of the 
support for the social dimension provided by the coalition of Socialist and Christian Democratic MEPs. 
  Once the budget line was voted, the ETUC formally set up the TUTB.  Small as its staff is, the 
TUTB has become an active and respected advocate of union views on health and safety issues.68  It 
provides the technical basis for positions taken by the workers group in the ACSH ( which a member 
of the ETUC Secretariat coordinates even though the ETUC  is not formally a member).69  The TUTB 
has also achieved the more difficult feat of penetrating the standardization process and participating 
directly in it, at least in the preparation of those standards which have high priority from a union 
perspective.70  Finally, the TUTB has been building up a network of experts on technical issues from 
the ETUC’s national members and their affiliated unions, simultaneously extending an awareness of 
the ETUC and the services it can provide and Europeanizing national level union officials by drawing 
them into European level activity. 71 
  The creation of the TUTB offers a particularly clear case of the construction of European level 
interest organization through the interplay between European institutions and organizational actors. 
The ETUCO story is slightly different.  The 1988 Stockholm ETUC Congress gave a mandate to the 
ETUC Executive Committee to prepare a proposal on a "European Trade Union Academy” to organize 
"trade union training and education at a truly European level.”72  The idea of doing this had been 
bruited about for some, but the decisive initiative came from ETUC’s Austrian affiliate, the ÖGB. 73 
The Secretariat document proposing ETUCO noted that employers organizations and multinational 
companies were way ahead of unions in providing about education about Europe to company 
executives.  The main groups targetted  for ETUCO were full time trade union officials and workplace 
representatives for whom "completion of the internal market has either explicit or implicit implications. 
"  ETUCO courses would educate such people on European matters, European institutions and their 
workings, problems posed for union movements by the Single Market plus new possibilities for unions 
which European level change opened. 74   
  ETUC’s resources were limited, so it  would use existing national union training facilities as much 
as possible. Fees nonetheless had to be kept lower than remaining costs, and this was where the 
Commission came in. DG V and the Delors staff quickly seized upon the ETUCO idea and helped 
ETUC refine it. They also decided that it would be highly desirable to provide EC/EU funds, including 
payment for translators, as start-up costs, upwards of one million ecu. ETUCO courses began modestly 
in 1991 but quickly produced significant results in bringing together unions from different national 
settings around common European matters.75  As the need for European-level union activists and 
leaders has become less abstract, particularly with the passage of the European Works Council 
Directive in 1994, ETUCO's role has grown larger.  
  The organizational reconfiguration of ETUC itself, consecrated at the ETUC's May, 1991 
Congress in Luxembourg,  was a larger, if similar, story.  The first source of the Congress was the 
Single Market itself.  Quite as important, however, were the Commission's more direct provision of 
incentives, presented in the mobilization around the social dimension described in Part 1.  Since ETUC 
was a Confederation of national Confederations, it was logical that the motivation towards change 
would come from national union movements, in this case initially from the German DGB, which had 
grown dissatisfied with the effectiveness of the ETUC. The German industrial relations system, 
constructed around solid sectoral meso-corporatism, could conceivably be changed by Euro-level 
decisions, particularly those involved in the social dimension. A stronger and organizationally 
modified ETUC, within which  the German voice would be powerful, could help assure that European 
decisions would not undercut the German context.  
  Ernst Breit, the DGB leader who was also President of the ETUC, initiated discussions in 1989 by 
approaching the three Italian Confederations. The DGB and the Italians then sent an official letter to 
Matthias Hinterscheid, long-time ETUC General Secretary, requesting a working group to rethink ETUC organization to make the ETUC more effective and professional, endow it with more resources 
and define its goals more clearly. Hinterscheid tried to stop the initiative by refusing to respond. The 
Germans and Italians mobilized further national pressure, from the Dutch in particular, meeting further 
resistance from Hinterscheid, whose obduracy sealed his fate. Not only would ETUC change its 
structures at its next Congress, it would also change its peak leadership. The Executive Committee set 
up a working group to examine the ETUC’s structure chaired Johan Stekelenburg, president of the 
Dutch Confederation of Labor ( FNV), at its December 1989 meeting. The Executive  Committee 
adopted the Stekelenburg report in December 1990.   
  The report claimed that the ETUC needed organizational changes for a list of reason, most having 
to do with the EC/EU- the Single Market and associated increases in EC/EU competences.76  The 
process of democratization  in Eastern Europe was the only development  on the list not directly 
initiated by European institutions.77  The reorganization proposals also suggested incorporating the so-
called "European industry committees" (EICs),  sectoral trade union organizations (many affiliates of 
ICFTU internationals) in the ETUC's power structure.78 Each of the 15 EICs would be given a seat on 
the ETUC Executive Committee, with voting rights on everything except financial and constitutional 
matters.  Three EIC representatives were also to sit, on a rotating basis, on the ETUC Steering 
Committee, the Confederation executive board.  Unions would thus be represented in the ETUC in two 
ways, through membership in their national confederations and through cross-national sectoral 
federations. This, in turn, would open up possibilities in the structure of European level trade union 
organization. 79  The sectoral industry committees,  in time, might become a direct link between the 
ETUC and unions, bypassing confederations themselves, perhaps giving the ETUC new legitimacy and 
sources of support. 
  The German DGB was decisive in ensuring that the May, 1991 Congress followed the 
recommendations of the Stekelenburg Report, particularly in changing the General Secretary.  L. Van 
Rens, author of the Stekelenburg report, was the most likely candidate at the outset, backed by the the 
Dutch, the Nordic confederations and the TUC. Emilio Gabaglio, from the Italian CISL, was the 
Mediterranean candidate, backed also by the French and the DGB. What looked like a stalemate was 
decided in favor of Gabaglio by successful DGB efforts to swing Nordic votes in exchange for the 
creation of a Nordic second deputy general secretary's position.80 The first Deputy General Secretary  
slot went to Jean Lapeyre, the French master of the Delors-Venturini-Commission connection, the 
second to a Finn.. 
 
ETUC After the 1991 Congress 
 
  The replacement of  the ETUC's tired, routinized leadership, committed to a modest lobbying role, 
was important. Gabaglio and his new team were brought in to promote, and assume, much greater roles. 
The basic strategic issue the team has had to face is whether the ETUC can move beyond being a 
lobbying organization in the European policy arena to become a bargainer within a European industrial 
relations system. In reality this has involved two separate questions. The first is whether a European 
industrial relations system can be constructed at all. The second concerns the role that the ETUC could 
have in such a system.81   The most important innovation  of the 1991 Congress was the official 
inclusion of European Industry Committees (EICs) into ETUC's structures.  This was a judicious 
change since in the medium term the definition of ETUC's role will depend on the evolution of Euro-
level unionism at sectoral level.82 The EICs, the  principal form of Europe-wide sectoral union 
organization, are listed in Table 3. 83 EICs are organizations of unions rather than an organization of 
confederations -- i.e., a peak association  like the ETUC -- and are closer to real bargaining issues.  
Since EICs are directly subject to their control national unions may be more willing to give them 
negotiating mandates than they have the ETUC.  The EICs also provide a more acceptable instrument 
through which unions could engage in cross-national joint action vis-a-vis employers. Thus far, there is 
considerable variation in the extent to which the EICs' member unions are willing to give them 
mandates to negotiate, but as one source suggests, they could become the "bodies which might one day 
be the main union parties in European-level bargaining."84  
 
     Table  3.    European  Industry  Committees 
 
Name ³Sector(s) ³Foun-  ³Affiliates ³Members ³Staff  ³Budget   ³ ³ded  ³ ³ ³ ³(million  BF) 
  ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
EMF: European Federation of Metalworkers  ³Metal manufacturing/engineering  ³1971  ³43
 ³6,000,000  ³9a  ³27.0 
  ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
EURO-FIET: Euro Reg’l Org, Internat’l ³Banking, Retail/Wholesale Trade,  ³ 1972  ³129
  ³6,000,000  ³4  ³c. 3.2  
Feder Commer, Clericical, Professional and  ³Insurance, Cleaning  ³  ³  ³
 ³  ³ 
Technical  Employees  ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ ³[800,000SF] 
  ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
ETUC:TCL: Euro Trade Union Committee:  ³Textiles, clothing, leather footwear ³1964  ³43
  ³1,300,000  ³2.5  ³   7.0 
Textiles,  Clothing  and  Leather  ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
ECF-IUF: Euro Committee of Food,  ³Food processing, hotels, restaurants  ³c1958  ³70
  ³1,400,000  ³4  ³  14.0 
Catering  &  Allied  Workers’  Unions  in  IUF  ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
EFBWW: Euro Feder of Building and  ³Construction, woodworking, forestry  ³ 1958  ³51
  ³3,100,000  ³ 6  ³  27.0 
Woodworkers ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
EPSC: European Public Services  ³ Public sector    ³ 1974  ³   100  ³   7,000,000  ³    5
 ³c.  4.0 
Committee  ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ ³[1  million  SF] 
  ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
EFCGU: European Federation of Chemical  ³Chemicals, pharmaceuticals, glass, ³ 1988  ³     51 
  ³  2,000,000  ³ 5  ³ 10.0 
and General Workers Unions  ³ceramics, pulp & paper, energy and  ³  ³(5 obs-  ³
 ³  ³ 
  ³mineral oil, rubber, plastics  ³  ³ervers)  ³  ³  ³ 
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÅÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ 
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  For the time being the EICs are more important as links between national unions and the ETUC, 
providing channels through which unions can lobby the ETUC as well as the Commission, a means for 
implementing policies agreed at the ETUC level, and, not least, a mechanism for building cross-border 
networks of national and local union officials and exposing them to European issues. However, the 
capacity of the EICs to act in any of these areas is severely limited by their resources. They tend to be 
very small operations, although larger than they were prior to 1991, with minimalist staffs. 
  The most important impetus for beefing up EICs has come from European institutions, the 
Commission in the first instance. After it became clear that the 1991 directive to establish European 
Works Councils (EWCs) would be tied up in Council the Commission decided to fund EIC  efforts to 
prepare proactively for eventual EWCs.  The meetings that very quickly proliferated were initially 
financed by the Commission  until the European Parliament established a separate budget line for them 
in 1992.85 14 million Ecu were appropriated for 1992 and 17 million thereafter.86  The funds, more 
than four times the total of all EICs budgets combined, quickly became the major factor in EIC 
organizational and resource growth.  In effect, targeted EU financing reshaped much of  the EICs' 
activity. Sectoral unions have come to spend the bulk of their effort anticipating EWCs.87    The coming of larger resources after 1991 have improved EIC operations. There has been a 
generational change in their leadership, for example, and relatively young, bright, and energetic new 
general secretaries or directors (they have various titles) have moved in.88 In addition to providing 
fresh impetus to the EICs, this new cohort is beginning to create an EIC collective identity and 
common view of sectoral union strategy through frequent  meeting among themselves informally as 
well as under ETUC auspices.  Still, despite increased resources and organizational renewal EIC staffs 
remain small and overwhelmed with complex new tasks.89  Beyond their specific unionist jobs 
(interacting with the ETUC, its other bodies, each other, and national unions), EICs also operate in the 
EC decision-making arena, where they deal with the Commission, ECOSOC, and Parliament, in 
sectoral social dialogue, and in the transnational company arena, where they mobilize unions from the 
companies' different national units in an effort to secure agreements on EWCs or similar arrangements.  
These arenas intersect substantially. 
  The EICs' roles in ETUC decision making and in EC level activities of the ETUC such as social 
dialogue meetings and lobbying are not yet completely clear.  One EIC official claimed that ETUC 
wants to restrict EICs to matters directly concerning their sectors, whereas the EICs argue for a voice 
on general issues as well. This is certainly not the full story, and it may be that the relatively quiet role 
EICs have thusfar played in ETUC decision-making is more a function of officials from insufficiently 
staffed organizations being stretched too thin. In any event, the EICs have not participated in ETUC 
decision-making to the extent expected at the time of the 1991 Congress.90  Within the broader EC/EU 
realm the EICs operate primarily within the ETUC structure, participating in ETUC decision-making 
about the positions to be taken on EU policy issues as well lobbying on their own in support of ETUC 
positions or sectoral issues.91  The EICs' main concern here has been to give their members voice in 
the formulation of legislation affecting them. 92  
  EIC officials often mention one important Commission obstacle. Commission General 
Directorates other than DG V are reluctant to consider union views, arguing that they are responsible 
only for the technical subjects in their bailiwick and not social implications, which  belong to DG V. 
DG II, in formulating the second banking directive, thus rebuffed EURO-FIET pressure to address the 
social consequences of the sector's restructuring in anticipation of the single market. Similarly,  DG I 
(external affairs and trade) refused to consider the demands by TCL (clothing, textiles, and leather 
products) to incorporate social clauses in EC application of the General System of Preferences.93  A 
directorate's openness to EIC inputs is no guarantee that it will go along, however, as FIET found when 
it failed to secure restrictions on franchising practices even though DG XXII accepted responsibility 
for taking possible negative social consequences into account. 
  It is the internal patterns of politics of the Commission which is of interest here. Social and 
industrial relations policy matters are ghettoized administratively. DG V and a few others do what they 
can while everyone else refuses to touch social matters on the grounds that they are DG V's job. Over 
time this practice has helped reinforce DG V's internal Commission reputation for having been 
captured by unions and other interest groups. This is a convenient excuse for other DGs to wash their 
hands of the "social" matters in their own areas.94 EICs have pursued various strategies to get around 
the problem.  In addition to seeking support in other forums such as Parliament and ECOSOC and 
mobilizing national affiliates to pressure their own governments they have resorted to protests to 
Delors and, in at least one instance, public demonstrations.  The most typical strategy has been to seek 
agreement with employers in their sector on a common position to be jointly put before the 
Commission and other EC institutions in successive stages of legislation. 95 Roundtables with 
representatives from several DGs as well as the social partners have met on particular issues.96 
  Despite these changes, the ETUC remains "primarily a lobbyist,." according to insiders.97  What 
has changed is its "self understanding" and its public position. The new Secretary General, Emilio 
Gabaglio, has made it "much more visible" -- as evidenced by the much greater extent to which it is 
noticed by the press -- and a more regular interlocutor with EC institutions, informally as well as 
formally.  He has "introduced regular meetings with each new Council president and ministers to talk 
about priorities." We know too little about the ETUC's effectiveness as a lobbyist, however. Its role 
clearly grew after the SEA, particularly in the campaign for a social dimension, around the Social 
Charter and subsequent Action Program legislation.  Much of this heightened activity was a response 
to Commission efforts to mobilize ETUC in support of "its" social dimension.  In the health and safety 
aspect of the social dimension ETUC contributed to the Framework Directive, working quite 
effectively through the workers' group of the ACSH and provided an important ally to those in the Commission who were trying to extract the most possible mileage from the opening provided by the 
SEA. 98 The ETUC has routinely tried to work with the trade union group and Socialists in the 
European Parliament,  but with less than perfect success .99 At the same time, the ETUC has depended 
heavily on EP support, particularly for funding ETUC operations such as ETUCO and TUTB, an 
indicator of at least some influence over the Parliament.  
  ETUC expresses its views on broad economic policy issues, but it is not clear that these carry 
much weight except when it is in the interests of more important actors, the Commission in particular, 
to invoke them.  Much of ETUC’s public position-taking - like its repeated pronouncements on 
economic policy - seems more ritual than anything else. Moreover, at least in the Delors’ decade,  
ETUC positions have often “shadowed” Commission positions from slightly further to the Left, 
indicating yet again that ETUC opinion may have been shaped first and foremost by what the 
Commission wanted to do. On narrower issues such as specific directives, the ETUC has tried to 
maximize its consultative role, with  uneven success. On workplace health and safety, for example, 
where the ETUC has an institutionalized role, it has played an active and influential role. 100 On other 
directives,  ETUC has been consulted, but the Commission is always constrained to prudent realism 
about Council responses (sometimes, we suspect, persuading ETUC to be realistic itself in the same 
ways)  and, even then, the Council has almost always "downsized" Commission offerings. At  Council 
stage national unions, or at least those with serious national power, tend to use their weight to pressure 
their own governments rather than  ETUC. 
 
Bargaining at Euro-Level?  ETUC and the Maastricht Social Protocol  
 
  The signing of the Maastricht Social Protocol in December 1991 raised the prospect that the 
ETUC might become a Euro-level bargainer.  Quick Maastricht ratification,  which everyone expected,  
would have led the Commission to invoke its "negotiate or we'll legislate"  powers where the ground 
had already been well prepared by Action Program Directives held up in Council.101 The ETUC thus  
had to sort out with its constituents what, if any, bargaining  role ETUC might be allowed to play in the 
new context.To discuss these  possibilities ETUC convened a conference on "European Collective 
Bargaining - ETUC Strategy” in Luxembourg in  June 1992.  The position paper from the conference 
submitted to the October 1992 meeting of the Executive  Committee laid out an ambitious agenda for 
"Europeanization” of collective bargaining with ETUC in a key role  stressing the importance of rights 
of association, collective action, bargaining for democracy and calling for explicit recognition of these 
rights at European  level.102  It argued that legitimated Euro-level representation was needed because 
of the deteriorating effects of economic integration  on national collective bargaining.  Furthermore, 
ETUC constituent organizations should learn to coordinate national and transnational "bargaining 
issues,” not to replace or weaken what happened at national level, but to give it "a new dimension.”  
  The central question was how to use the opportunities opened by Maastricht. The October draft 
sought to clarify processes to promote the convergence and supranational coordination of European 
collective bargaining.  Convergence,  meaning the "harmonization” of demands, would have to occur 
at four  levels: confederal, sectoral committees,  transnational companies and cross-border regions  
(reflecting the constituent organizations of ETUC).  Harmonization would occur gradually, consistent 
with sectoral and country specificities, and would be facilitated by the incorporation of European 
perspectives (ETUC positions) by national member organizations. 103 ETUC, UNICE and CEEP were 
identified as the "natural” representatives at Euro level, while ETUC organizations (EICs and ITUCs) 
would have to become "key players” at sectoral and crossborder region levels. 104 The conformity of 
Euro-level negotiations with bargaining mandates would be monitored and assessed by the ETUC and 
EIC executive committees, with continuing 'steering’ by the ETUC Social Dialogue and Collective 
Bargaining Committee. Next, concerning the nature and scope of any Euro-bargain that might be 
reached (eg. where it would fit in national settings),  Euro-agreements should be "framework” deals to 
be filled in and made binding at national, sectoral and transnational levels. Finally, promising issues 
for exploring European bargaining possibilities  included a "legal framework for basic social rights” 
plus continuing training, employment and jobs, work organization and hours, rights of migrant workers, 
work environment.  Subjects for sectoral and transnational enterprise levels would be specific to 
them.105 
  The October draft anticipated the difficulties of Euro-level operations, the unwillingness of 
UNICE to bargain, reiterated at the July 1992 social dialogue summit, being the most important. UNICE’s position was that the October 1991 agreement could have no force apart from the Maastricht 
Treaty, that it would not go into effect until the Treaty was ratified, and that it applied only to subjects 
about which the Commission proposed to legislate.106   The failure of  the Commission to propose 
that followed the difficulties in ratifying Maastricht (which did not happen until late 1993) removed 
any pressure on UNICE  to negotiate. This, the October draft noted, made it necessary to turn to 
classical trade union methods of mobilizing organizational resources to put pressure on employers. To 
do this, social dialogue had to be extended beyond the peak level European organizations to sectoral, 
transnational company, and national levels.  Hence, the industry committees would have "a key role” 
in engaging sectoral level employers in bargaining over problems posed by the completion of the 
single market.  Likewise, the "establishment of works councils in transnational groups” had to be 
accelerated.  Finally, the member confederations had to "'provoke’ national employers’ organizations 
into making European social dialogue a concrete reality at national level.”  
  The bottom line was that as long as UNICE refused to bargain, ETUC would not have any 
bargaining role. To acquire such a role, ETUC would seek to "change the balance of power,” by 
pressuring UNICE to negotiate and to do this it looked to its organizational components at other levels.  
Developing social dialogue on other levels, particularly sectoral,  might put pressure on UNICE to 
negotiate with ETUC, probably because UNICE  would otherwise lose influence over important 
matters which were being negotiated elsewhere. For this to work, ETUC’s component organizations 
had to be both willing and able to produce collective bargaining at their levels and UNICE had to be 
unable to stop it from happening.  
  Constituents' comments on the October draft (there were 25  showed reluctance to give ETUC 
much of a bargaining role.107  The main dissent came from the Germans.108  At the December ETUC 
executive meeting the DGB asked to postpone decision  to consult with member unions.  After this IG 
Metall's strong objections served as the basis for a more substantial revision by the ETUC’s social 
dialogue steering committee.  Changes adopted at the March, 1993,  ETUC Executive Committee 
curbed ETUC authority to engage in negotiations.  The provision in the October draft that the "ETUC 
will, at regular intervals, set the common priorities to be advanced at the different levels of bargaining, 
including the Community level,” as well as the list of possible subjects for negotiations, were replaced 
by a statement that  
At the interprofessional and sectoral levels, and where appropriate, in transnational companies, the 
competent organs of the unions and their European-level organizations [i.e., industry committees] will 
decide what issues and demands should form the subject of European collective bargaining.  The 
competent organs of the ETUC will establish, in agreement with affiliated organisations, the subjects 
and objectives of intersectoral bargaining.109 
 
  The basic issue at stake was how much power the ETUC’s affiliates and their own consitutuent 
unions were willing to give the ETUC to pursue a European bargaining agenda for negotiations with 
UNICE. The answer, in March 1993, was "not much."  The ETUC was allowed to explore becoming a 
bargainer subject to strict and continuous control by the national unions exercised through national 
confederation representatives on ETUC governing bodies. The first major opportunity that ETUC has 
had to develop this role occurred over European Works' Councils, as we will see later. 
  The structural problem still standing in the way of the ETUC becoming a bargainer: is the status of 
its immediate constituents,  national confederations and sectoral unions. The biggest member 
confederations, the British TUC and the DGB have no negotiating mandates. But European sectoral 
union structures are not up to negotiating either because of their limited resources and the dependence 
of some of them on ICFTU International Trade Union Secretariats. Strengthening the EICs has thus 
become one of the ETUC's most pressing contemporary issues. Discussions of the matter, begun at the 
June, 1993 ETUC executive meeting, were scheduled to reach some conclusions at the May 1995 
ETUC Congress, but the Congress did not resolve it.. 
 
Sectoral Social  Dialogue 
 
  One clear  role of European Industrial Committees is to engage in social dialogue at the sectoral 
level. Action has been limited, in general, but EICs have made some headway in developing sectoral 
social dialogue by joint lobbying with their employer counterparts on issues before EC bodies, such as 
draft directives. From the union perspective, sectoral social dialogue is viewed as a process of engaging employers in a whole spectrum of discussions ranging from exchange of views through such 
joint lobbying and eventually to real negotiation.  At this point,  simply getting employers to sit down 
officially as employers, even if not to negotiate collective agreements, is deemed promising as a way 
of drawing employers into confidence-building social dialogue.  
  This confidence-building dimension has long been sought to the Commission, which encouraged 
sectoral talks by offering to consult with the sectoral "social partners" once they formally agreed to 
enter into social dialogue through regularly scheduled meetings of the organizations and joint working 
groups.  Thus after social dialogue was formally set up by the construction EIC and employers 
association, the Commission promised to solicit their views on all measures by which it proposed to 
implement the Social Charter Action Program -- a promise not always kept in timely fashion.110  In 
this and other ways, the Commission role in fostering sectoral social dialogue is somewhat ambiguous, 
since it has almost always privileged top level social dialogue over sectoral discussions.111 
  The main political obstacle to EIC efforts to establish sectoral social dialogue has not been lack of 
Commission support but rather UNICE’s opposition.  UNICE has sought to confine the social dialogue 
contemplated by Article 118A of the SEA to discussions among the Community level organizations, 
where it could be sure to block progress. The Maastricht social protocol does not seem to have changed 
this position.  Until recently, UNICE  members faithfully echoed its opposition to extending social 
dialogue to the sectors.  Thus, when invited by EURO-FIET to a meeting to discuss the potential 
employment effects of bank restructuring, the European banking industry organizations refused to send 
anyone except "experts" not officially representing the organizations. 112 In the same vein, the 
European chemical industry association agreed to attend a joint conference on health and safety, 
retraining and mobility in Paris only if it were hosted by a French foundation rather than the 
Commission (even though the Commission funded it).  
  Employer unity behind UNICE's opposition to sectoral social dialogue has been by no means 
complete and durable, however.  Some employers, like those in construction, have actually stated that 
UNICE no longer represents them and have then formally joined sectoral dialogue with EICs.  Even 
within UNICE, there was some retreat and consideration of organizational changes to avert the 
defection of employers with an interest in sectoral level discussions.  Such interest has been triggered 
most by Commission legislative initiatives that employers hoped to influence, following a belief that 
success would be more likely if the Commission or other bodies were approached jointly by the social 
partners ( a belief encouraged by the Commission).113  The Commission and EICS have thus 
combined to induce some employers to begin limited sectoral social dialogue. Where this has worked it 
is undoubtedly because the employers in question do not have sufficient access to the EU legislative 
process on their own, directly or via their governments, to get what they want, mainly in weaker 
sectors.114  Large transnationals like Unilever or ICI do not feel the need for union allies, which 
undoubtedly helps explain their stalwart support for UNICE's resistance to sectoral social dialogue.115    
  EICs seek to identify circumstances under which employers can be drawn into discussions. 
Directives are not the only such circumstances, even if they are the most important.  The perceived 
need for European level rules on some subject on which there is as yet no Commission initiative is 
another.  Thus, the "property services" (cleaning) employers association and EURO-FIET easily found 
common ground in their desire for some enforceable standards to protect law-abiding firms against 
competition from "cowboys" who disregard rules embodied in law or collective agreements.  Getting 
money from the ESF and ERDF (regional development funds) is another inducement, whose 
effectiveness depends on how the Commission decides to play.  The advance programming of the 
"structural funds" coordinated by the Commission can be used to make employers bargain with unions 
when, as in one situation, the employers were told they could only come in with project proposals -- 
e.g., for retraining displaced workers -- prepared jointly with the relevant unions.   With recent changes 
in structural fund guidelines explicitly enjoining social dialogue, this practice is likely to grow. 
  EICs have been particularly successful in bringing employers to the table on health an safety 
issues, where incentives to engage in social dialogue are particularly strong.  The resulting levelling of 
the playing field is particularly welcome to firms which cannot or do not want to avoid stringent 
national health and safety standards.  Morever, the legitimacy of union claims to a European level 
voice is more widely conceded in this area than most others, while the wall between health and safety 
and other industrial relations issues seems high enough to prevent agreements concerning the former 
from serving as precedents. Thus, there will be rules, unions will influence them, and employers will 
improve their prospects of influencing them by joining with unions.     In general, from the EICs' perspective, the goal is to find an issue where there is some potential 
for a precedent-setting agreement.  As EURO-FIET’s director put it, "If you want an agreement, start 
on a subject where you're likely to get an agreement, even if it's not the key issue." While EICs have 
sometimes been able to overcome the obstacle of political resistance to sectoral dialogue by careful 
selection of such issues, they have often then faced another  institutional obstacle, however.  Often 
there is no counterpart employer organization with a mandate to discuss social matters which an EIC 
could bring to the table.  Although this has often been a convenient pretext for blocking sectoral social 
dialogue, it has also been a real problem that employers interested in, or at least not opposed to, 
dialogue have had to solve. In commercial banking, for example, there is a German type of division 
into separate employers and industry organizations in five countries and unitary organizations in the 
seven others, with the European commercial banking organization insisting that it could not enter into 
social dialogue because it was only an industry association.  A similar argument was made in the 
chemical industry, where the German employers opposed participation in sectoral social dialogue by 
the European industry association in the interest of preserving the distinction between industry and 
employer associations to which they were accustomed, leaving the ECFGU without a "social partner." 
In this case the Germans were also leading an effort to fill the gap by creating a European level 
employers counterpart to the industrial association.116    
  There is organizational fragmentation on the union side as well.  Multiple unionism, along 
occupational lines, as in Britain, or along political lines, as in France, has been a source of difficulty in 
arriving at common union positions. The chemical sector EIC secretary complained that instead of 17 
unions in 17 countries, his organization had 49 unions. Differences in the distribution of negotiating 
authority among different organizational levels in different countries also make it hard to for EICs -- 
not to speak of ETUC -- to get a mandate to perform a representative function. Even more serious are 
conflicts of interest, real or perceived, among unions from different countries, notably between those 
from Northern high wage and Southern low wage countries. Organizational boundaries can also be an 
obstacle to effective action on issues that cut across the sectoral lines along which the EICs are built.  
This is obviously the case with respect to  EC legislation affecting the whole labor market such as the 
framework directive on health and safety, public procurement, working hours, etc.  If trans-sectoral 
matters at the EC level were left to the ETUC, there would of course be no problem of coordination 
among the EICs for them to worry about.  But, as noted earlier, the EICs are not content to leave the 
ETUC to represent them in such matters. 117 
  Despite all this there has been a limited amount of genuine sectoral dealing at European level, 
usually emerging from sectoral social dialogue. The "posting" directive discussed earlier was finally 
blocked in the Council in December 1994 due to opposition from four Member States.118  But getting 
this number down to four was an achievement of joint efforts between EFBWW and the employers 
organization because many more states originally opposed it.  EURO-FIET has engaged in a 
continuing campaign for recognition as a social partner, making repeated demands on the Commission 
for recognition and support and for ETUC support for its demands to the Commission, and expressing 
dissatisfaction with both the Commission’s and ETUC’s responses.119  EURO-FIET has nonetheless 
achieved modest breakthroughs in getting employers to reach joint agreements in the retail trade sector,  
property services, banking and insurance.120   There has been additional social dialogue to determine 
working hours regulations in sectors granted derogations from the working time directive (hotels, 
transport, fishing, merchant marine). 
 
III. Dénouement:  Real Deals?  
 
  It was the first post-Maastricht threat of legislation,  over European Works Councils, in later 1993,  
that opened prospects for genuine Euro-level bargaining. The brief, if very intense,  episode that 
followed revealed a great deal about how far ETUC and its constituents had moved towards effective 
transnationalization. It also opened up a whole new arena for European union action which has very 
recently led towards a genuine framework agreement between the European social partners on parental 
leave. Finally, it marked the beginning of the end of Delors Commissions' major initiatives in 
industrial relations policies and the beginning of a new era in European social policy.  
  The Maastricht Treaty ran into unexpected ratification problems, beginning with rejection of the 
treaty by referendum in Denmark in June, 1992.  Behind these problems, as evidenced in further 
referenda in Ireland and France plus public opinion polls across Europe, was declining public support for the EC/EU. Rising unemployment, the onset of deep recession and the currency crises that racked 
the EMS deepened the new gloom.  Maastricht was thus not officially ratified until November, 1993.  
In the event of quick ratification the Commission had planned to re-propose many of the social policy 
directives pending in the Council of Ministers under the new Social Protocol.  Delayed ratification also 
delayed use of the Social Protocol, however. Once ratification actually happened and with one 
remaining year in power, the Delors Commission had to choose its strategic opening carefully.  
  The Commission's first step was to produce a document operationalizing the Maastricht Social 
Protocol procedure.121 Two possible approaches to social matters existed,  that following  the EEC 
treaty before Maastricht and the Maastricht Protocol.  The Commission announced that it would 
choose on a case-by-case basis, excepting only health and safety proposals, where the old qualified 
majority procedures would continue. Under the Maastricht Protocol  there would be two six-week 
preliminary consultations between the Commission and the social partners about the general area for 
potential legislation and then concerning the potential contents of such legislation. The social partners 
could then decide either to deliver opinions or recommendations to the Commission for its legislative 
task or "inform the Commission of their desire to embark, in the context of their bargaining 
independence, upon a process of negotiation which could lead to a direct agreement between the 
parties." The negotiating process could then have four possible outcomes: bargained agreement plus a 
request to the Council to grant it the force of law; bargained agreement to be implemented by the 
bargaining parties and the Member states;  request to the Commission to extend the negotiating period; 
or failure to reach agreement. In the case of failure the Commission could then begin the legislative 
process.  
  The Commission's choice to test the Maastricht arrangements was  the European Works Council 
Directive. 122 The "information and consultation of workers" proposal had a long EC/EU history, 
stretching back to the 1980 Vredeling Directive that had been buried because of British obduracy and a 
lobbying barrage from the American Chamber of Commerce in Europe and UNICE. 123 The Social 
Charter Action Program had also proposed a directive and the Council's unwillingness  to pass it was 
the primary reason for its reintroduction under the Maastricht Protocol.124 
  By 1993 there was some experience with the works councils, since where conditions were 
favorable, proto-European Works Councils had come into being, particularly in German and French 
large companies., as shown in Table 4.  These "proto" works councils varied considerably, however,, 
since they had usually emerged within national settings without European-level regulatory 
constraints.125  The majority were formal agreements, for several were less formal arrangements. 
Most were information-sharing in character, concerning trans-national or group-wide matters,  without 
obligatory consultation procedures  (Volkswagen was a partial exception to this limitation).  In most 
cases they emphasized certain issues - training, health and safety, working conditions, environment, 
the organization of work, new technologies, research and development.  Some were made up of 
employee representatives alone,  others joint management-employee organizations. Most were small, 
with only about 30 employee representatives, most often nominated by unions from among exisiting 
elected employee representatives  by unions, and met once a year at employer expense.126   
  Table4:  Companies with European-level Arrangements for Consultation and/or Provision of 
Information to Employee Representatives in Mid-1993 
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  The situation was complicated even more with the Parliament's 1991 decision to finance proactive 
efforts by unions to prepare for official works councils. The money was supplied, through the 
Commission, to EICs to bring together workers in trans-national companies for preliminary meetings.   
While in some sectors  there had already been some activity the Europarliamentary money encouraged 
a considerable increase. 128  The numbers of preliminary meetings accelerated in a wide range of EICs 
such that as of 1994 over 490 preliminary meetings had occurred, usually at union request, in 290 
multinationals. 129  Thus in general,  prior to the Commission's new push, there was already an 
important groundswell of support for EWCs from the European labor movement itself. 130  To a much 
greater degree than anyone could have expected, therefore, European unions were prepared to act once 
EWCs had been legally consecrated.131 
  The first version of the new directive (presented by the Belgian Presidency in October, 1993) 
reconfigured the Commission's earlier 1991 proposal. It proposed a "European Works Council" based 
on negotiations,  in every "Community scale group of undertakings,"  defined as a group with at least 
1000 employees within the EC/EU plus two undertakings in different EC/EU member states with at 
least 100 employees in each.  EWCs would encompass all of an undertaking's operations within the 
EC/EU.  A "special negotiating body" of workers' representatives and employers to set up EWCs 
would specify, by written agreement, the scope, composition, powers and term of office of the EWCs 
in talks that would have to be held "in a spirit of co-operation with a view to reaching an agreement"  
Social partners had considerable latitude concerning the kinds of arrangements made, to take different 
national habits into account, but minimum requirements would mandate that an EWC be composed of 
no more than thirty members (drawn from existing employee representatives, or elected if such did not 
exist), meet at least annually, be informed of company activities and projects (i.e. accounts and 
strategic plans should be open) and before the implementation of any decision significantly affecting 
employees' interests. EWC competence will be limited to transnational matters concerning the group in 
question.  
  What then happened provided first illustrations of the complexities of Euro-level social policy 
dealings under the Maastricht Protocol arrangements. The initial consultation with the Social Partners began on November 17, 1993. ETUC and its Industry Committees favored the Belgian proposal while 
UNICE  declared a preference for "a broader voluntary approach."132  ETUC favored legislation while 
UNICE preferred a "Recommendation" or some other proposal of a less-binding nature. On whether 
information and consultation should be done by "appropriate machinery" (i.e. the Commission would 
specify minimum structural requirements) or by way of "alternative procedures," ETUC wanted 
binding minima while employers wanted maximal flexibility. UNICE was willing to bargain on the 
issue. ETUC did not pronounce.  
  Behind this, ETUC wanted full-strength EWCs, as contained in the initial proposal. UNICE was 
willing to negotiate to dilute the proposal and slow down the process.  ETUC, aware that the German 
EU Presidency to begin in July 1994 was determined to pass an EWC Directive, was lukewarm about 
negotiating out of fear of dilution and because the German unions, critical in granting ETUC any real 
negotiating mandate, were opposed to legislation that might undercut German codetermination.133 
The Commission wanted negotiations and knew that the threat of legislation by the German Presidency 
was likely to make UNICE more pliable.  
  After the first consultation the Commission reconfigured the proposal  ( February 8, 1994), 
seeking to ensnare UNICE by mildly watering it down, removing in particular the title "European 
Works Councils" (replaced by the catchy "mechanisms for informing and consulting employees in 
Community-scale undertakings or groups of undertakings").134 In most other respects the proposed 
directive resembled the initial draft with one important exception. It allowed "agreements in force" 
concerning works councils prior to the final date of transposition into national law (eventually 
September 1996) to be considered "prior acquired rights," subject to minimal conditions of conformity 
with the legislation. This step of "grandfathering" existing arrangements was a new incentive. Large 
numbers of multinationals would almost certainly establish such "agreements in force" immediately to 
gain flexibility before the directive was actually transposed.  If there was legislation, therefore, there 
would be a large number of EWCs very quickly.  
  The second consultation involved "social dialogue" to decide officially to negotiate or legislate. 
The first meeting occurred on February 23. ETUC insisted that any bargain declare that information 
and consultation was a fundamental right at European, general management and all other decision-
making levels, with workers' representation at all such levels. This representation should be structured, 
permanent and involve a transnational bargaining committee including official employee 
representatives (usually union members) and the general management of the firm. Finally, there should 
be minimum provisions applied to all "mechanisms."135 The ETUC also expressed preference that any 
agreement reached between UNICE, itself and CEEP (the public sector employers' federation) should 
be submitted to the Council to become Community law.  UNICE was willing to accept "appropriate 
arrangements" for information and consultation in multinational companies about transnational issues. 
The matter of information and consultation being a "right" was to be negotiated, however.  It also 
stressed "flexibility" and the need to examine alternative methods and procedures. 136 
  The March 17, 1994  meeting left a list of key matters to be settled. Was information and 
consultation of workers and their representatives a right in general? Should it become a right in 
transnational undertakings?  Should central managements be required to negotiate with representatives 
of workers (i.e. usually unionists), and if so appointed through what procedures, to set up such a 
mechanism? Third, should there be minimum provisions? Both parties desired to have the Council 
make any agreement they reached into Community law. Both also agreed to negotiations lasting a 
shorter period than the Social Protocol set out (ETUC two months, and UNICE three).137  
UNICE/CEEP responded, in the next session on March 23 by refusing to admit any right to 
information-consultation at transnational level and refusing to allow that "representatives of workers 
concerned" (union members) be implicated legally in the negotiation to set up the mechanisms.  ETUC 
then threatened to break off the negotiations. In response UNICE capitulated. Then the Confederation 
of British Industry (CBI) announced to the press that it disapproved of the movement towards 
negotiations and that it would no longer participate in discussions. 138 This led the ETUC to call the 
talks to an end.139 The process of legislation began soon thereafter on a "fast track" to ensure that a 
directive would be enacted during the German Council Presidency. The directive was passed by the 
Council on September 22, 1994 (94/45/EC).140 
   ETUC wanted the full results of legislation through bargaining to set a precedent for future Euro-
level industrial relations.  UNICE was willing to negotiate, but for the purposes of diluting the 
"mechanism for information-consultation."  The game was thus about how much dilution ETUC would accept to get the precedent for Euro-bargaining  vs how much UNICE was upgrade its minimalism to 
avoid legislation.  Background factors overdetermined the outcome.  Everyone knew that the German 
Council Presidency would push through the Commission's legislative proposal. This, plus the strong 
positions of German unions against watering down of the proposal, stiffened the determination of 
ETUC not to bargain downward and tempted UNICE to be minimalist.  Both ETUC and UNICE had 
mandate difficulties. For either to negotiate at European level was a new thing.  UNICE clearly had a 
serious problem with its Irish, Danish and British organizations. On the other hand, its Latin members 
(the Spanish, French and Italians) plus the Belgians were quite eager.  ETUC had, as it often has had, a 
German problem. The DGB favored legislation rather than negotiation. The heart of the story was that 
ETUC wanted a directive more than UNICE wanted negotiations to avoid a directive.141 
  If  the result did end prospects for bargaining at EC/EU level on EWCs, it  did not preclude further 
Euro-level collective bargaining. The EWC Directive itself obliged significant new Euro-level 
negotiations by the so-called "special negotiating bodies" to who were to put the mechanism into place.  
The number of multinationals falling under the directive’s criteria has been estimated as at least 1,300, 
taking into account the British opt-out and the expansion of the EU to 15.142  The total number of 
employees in those companies is around six million, about four percent of the EU labor force. If EWCs 
were set up in all companies subject to the directive, with union presence in all of them, only a small 
portion of the labor force would be linked to a European industrial relations system through EWCs, but 
the centrality of the companies and the importance of the breakthrough to transnational action could 
make the change important nonetheless. Campaigning in the UK to get cooperation from those British 
companies that do not fall directly under the legislation has already become a key demand for British 
unions.  And even though the Commission's directive cut back on possibilities for capturing British 
multinationals, at least a hundred UK-based multinationals are included, despite the UK opt-out from 
the Social Protocol. Some British companies have already indicated that they will establish EWCs 
even though not obliged, for example. Moreover, non-EC-EU headquartered transnationals will also 
have to include British activities in the their information-consultation mechanisms established. 
Transnational corporations headquartered outside the EC/EU, including US firms, will also be 
touched.143  General Motors, for example, has just indicated that it would set up a works council in its 
European operations. 
   The most significant effect of implementing the legislation may be on transnational European 
trade unionism itself.  If all 1,300 companies had EWCs with the maximum membership of 30,  39,000 
workplace activists would be drawn into transnational union work.  This would create an important 
pool of cadres for transnational union work at other levels, and might strengthen national union support 
for ETUC bodies, particularly the EICs.   Even if the numbers fall short of the maximum, new EWC 
members will have to begin rethinking union actions on a transnational basis, develop new practices of 
collaboration with colleagues from other countries and construct new linkages with union bases 
transnationally inside the company.  The ETUC itself will have to generate the intellectual and 
financial resources to help train these new people and the EICs will have to grow and change to 
support them.  
The 39, 000 number, however, is an upper limit. Actual developments may fall considerably short.  
Apart from anything else, many companies have possibilities for avoiding EWCs with much union 
presence by gaining employee acceptance of alternative arrangements. 144 The upsurge in company 
interest in "designer EWCs" since the passage of the directive is less the result of any conversion to 
dealing with unions at European level than a proactive hope for having an inoffensive "agreement in 
force" before the September 22, 1996 deadline. There is also a three year period after this deadline 
before establishment negotiations must be concluded. Wth the legislation, companies nonetheless have 
had to face the reality that they could not resist setting up, and paying for, EWCs sooner or later, 
provided that there were demands from their employees that satisfied the requirements of the directive.  
In short, a period of preliminary skirmishes is over, during which the EICS scoured Europe, using EP 
money, to lay the foundation stones of EWCs while the multinationals waited to see whether they 
needed to act at all. Now the companies will use their  considerable resources to make the coming of 
EWCs as gentle as possible. The unions are aware of this danger, but will they be able to match the 
means of their opponents?  
  The Commission decided to use the Maastricht protocol again in early 1995., this time on parental 
leave, an issue with a long history. The first directive was proposed in 1983 and blocked by the British. 
145  Later, 146 the Council approved Community action in the general area  in Article 16 of the Social Charter and in the Third Medium Term Action Programme on Equal Opportunities between Men and 
Women, 147   and in 1993-4 in debates over its White Paper on Social Policy and Medium Term 
Social Action Programme (1995-97).148  In February 1995, however,  matters began in earnest with a 
letter from the Acting Director General of DG V officially informing the social partners of the 
Commission's intention to act in the area of "the reconciliation of professional and family life" (not the 
narrower "parental leave") under the Maastricht Social Protocol and inviting them to the consultation 
procedures. clauses. 
   The first stage of  the consultation is designed to elicit the social partners general views on the 
desirability of Community action in a specific area. 149  All sides responded favorably to the idea of 
Community action and the second six-week consultation period opened in late June, 1995.  On July 5 
ETUC, UNICE and CEEP decided to bargain, thereby opening what ETUC called in its press release, 
"the first European negotiations." 150  The the organizations quickly alerted their constituents and 
sought negotiating mandates. From this point on, therefore, the negotiating parties, under the Chairing 
of Ms Jo Walgrave, President of the Belgian National Labor Council, had six months to conclude. 
  "Reconciliation" was an opportune theme for negotiation. UNICE and business wanted to avoid 
Euro-level action on parental leave, ETUC wanted negotiations in principle and thought that success 
on this issue might also help with its significant female labor constituency. Moreover, most EU 
member states already had parental leave arrangements which, in many cases, were more generous that 
what the negotiations were likely to turn out and this lowered the costs of bargaining.  Discussions 
centered on the minimum standards at the heart of the proposed framework agreement. The most 
profound issue was whether parental leave would be regarded as an individual  "right" available to 
everyone employed,  or whether access would be restricted. ETUC insisted on the former while 
UNICE wanted it only for workers in firms above 50 employees.  Everyone seemed to agree that the 
right length was three months, but there were disagreements about remuneration and continuation of 
social protection during this period. There also agreement that this leave should be  non-transferable 
(particularly from husband to wife), but some discord over the age limits of children for whose care the 
program was mainly designed  (eight, according to ETUC).  ETUC wanted the leave principle 
extended to "ascendants" as well as "descendants," and  to family crises as well.  Employers refused to 
agree to anything implying greater costs to them. There were also disagreements on criteria for 
eligibility (how long on the job, full time vs. part time, what to do with small firms, how long should 
the notification period be).  Everyone felt, however, that no leave arrangements under a framework 
accord should lower of existing standards in member states.  Both ETUC and UNICE also insisted that 
both public and private sectors be covered. 151  
  The negotiators had moved close to a general agreement in the early fall of 1995.  The first draft 
of a final accord was circulated on September 28.  The major remaining differences were on the "right" 
question, whether leave would be for care for dependent elderly parents and family emergencies, how 
universal (ETUC) vs flexible (UNICE) minimum requirements would be, and whether sectoral 
negotiations should follow (ETUC for, UNICE against).152  At time of writing (late October, 1995) no 
final agreement had been signed, but there were good reasons to anticipate that it would be. 
Furthermore, the Commission had pledged to open the same procedures on the two outstanding 
directives on "atypical work" 153  European level collective bargaining had come into being.  ETUC 
had taken its first steps towards becoming a bargainer. 
 
Conclusions: The End of an Era? 
 
  The "Delors decade" that ended in January, 1995 was the most activist period in social policy in 
EC/EU history. In terms of its accomplishments in the areas of labor standards, Euro-bargaining and 
industrial relations it is a matter of deciding whether the glass is half-full or half-empty.  For those with 
images of the rapid transfer of national neo-corporatist settings to Euro levels, the glass is half-empty. 
For those, were aware from the beginning of the modesty of the EC/EU's legitimate claims and 
capacities, the glass is half-full.  There have been important legislative advances - health and safety 
protection, equal protection of men and women,  protection of free movement of labor and social 
dialogue. But in only a few cases can one speak of more than beginnings and useful precedents. 
   The construction of national industrial relations systems and other regulatory mechanisms took 
decades. Moreover, however weakened national systems presently are in the face of 
internationalization, they still provide considerable protection, even if the damaging effects of internationalization are expanding.  It may well be that European-level advances will not be enough to 
compensate. In general it is too early to tell. The  most important advance, both on its own and because 
of its implications, was the European Works Council episode. The Works Council legislation has 
provided precedent for further invocation of the Maastricht Social Protocol "negotiate or we will 
legislate" approach by the European Commission which is presently being followed on other matters. 
The unfolding process has proceeded far enough to indicate that both ETUC and UNICE are willing to 
contemplate European-level negotiation and that they will be able to generate the organizational 
resources to do so.  These things in themselves are substantial changes.154 
  The ETUC, originally a lobbying organization narrowly controlled by its national constituents, has 
become a much more significant actor since the mid-1980s. This has largely been because it has been 
called upon repeatedly to respond to the European Commission's activist programs, as we have seen. 
Its ability to seize greater autonomy and a new role has been limited, however, by the lack of 
meaningful linkages with day-to-day union activity at branch and rank-and-file level, where Europe 
and European integration have remained abstractions. The construction of works Councils, the 
strengthening of Industry Committees and other new activities  may begin to provide these linkages. 
Successes in bargaining over  "reconciliation" and atypical work will deepen the ETUC's presence.  
  The context in which the effectiveness of social dimension policies and practices should be judged 
has changed, however. The years since the Maastricht Treaty  have been perilous for the Community. 
The severe recession that began in 1992 revealed fundamental problems that had been discounted 
earlier, in particular that  Europe had been falling relatively behind. In the words of the 1993 
Commission White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, "the truth is that although we 
have changed, the rest of the world has changed even faster."155 Over the last two decades the 
European economy's potential rate of growth has shrunk from 4% to around 2.5% annually, 
unemployment has been rising from cycle to cycle, the investment ratio has fallen by five percent and 
the EC's competitive position in relation to the USA and Japan has worsened. The biggest problem is 
EC-EU's unemployment level.  As of 1995 over 10% of the labor force were out of work. In the words 
of the White Paper, since the first oil shock in 1973 "80% more wealth has been created but total 
employment has risen by only 9%."  On average, EC-EU economies have created too few jobs, a fact 
that looked particularly glaring when compared to the USA.  
  Recognition of this fundamental problem is the major new element in the social policy debate.  
The unspoken assumption of the "1992" period was that completing the Single Market and 
implementing EMU would stimulate European economic growth, technological innovation, wealth and 
job creation to new levels competitive with other industrialized areas of the world. The 1992-93 
recession and joblessness thereafter made clear that this assumption had been wrong.  Elites concluded 
that further basic reforms needed to be proposed. A new political wave in favor of deregulation, 
particularly of labor markets, also appeared. Whatever will come of this wave, the order of the day has 
begun to shift from constructing Euro-level social regulatory policies to reconfiguring arrangements to 
bring the European economy into the race for competitiveness.  Reconfiguring labor markets in an 
institutional and organizationally dense area like the EC-EU will be difficult to do without a great deal 
more Euro-level bargaining, and European Commissions could encourage this, but European unions 
and the ETUC have to be resourceful and intelligent enough to seize the occasion. . 
   In the face of those who advocate a wholesale labor market deregulation that could destroy the 
uniqueness of the "European model of society" the Commission's 1993 White Paper concluded that 
"the Community cannot hope to address the consequences of the international relocation of many jobs 
through wage-price competition." 156  In the employment realm, it continued,  that national actions 
have "generally been aimed more at reducing unemployment than at increasing employment... in broad 
terms, the way in which taxes and social contributions are raised seems to take little or no account of 
their potential effects on the level of employment."  Pressures to increase labor market flexibilitiy had 
thus often created dual labor markets and reduced incentives for firms and individuals to invest in 
training and recruitment. The Commission agreed that reform of labor market regulation was in order, 
but it should be accompanied by broader efforts to achieve a higher rate of employment.  It suggested 
focussing on  "the broader employment environment, paying particular attention to the effects of 
financial deterrents to employment creation embodied in taxation and related fiscal systems" while 
increasing investment in the Community's human resources. 157   Policy suggestions include 
bargained measures to share gains from productivity growth to create jobs rather than being "absorbed 
mainly by those already in employment."158 Measures should also be devised to "increase the number of jobs for given levels of output" by shortening hours and encouraging work-time flexibility. Tax and 
social security systems should be changed to remove disincentives for employing less skilled workers 
and lower the relative cost of labor with respect to other production factors. 159 There should be new 
income support schemes to supplement low wages, while the the concept of work should be "widened" 
to facilitate reentry into the labor market. The most striking proposals are in the "human capital" area, 
pointing towards the operationalization of life-time learning.  
  Perhaps Europe will be able to produce policies and cooperation to support what the Commission 
calls the development of "active solidarities" to enhance competitiveness without unduly undercutting 
the positions of the "social partners."  If it is unable to do so, the risk of a downward deregulatory 
spiral will be very great. The degree to which the EC\EU's reflections have changed is illustrated in the 
Commission's recent Green Paper on social policy whose contents, rather than a positive set of 
proposals, are a set of open questions, as if European Social Policy had suddenly become a tabula 
rasa.160  The Commission's subsequent White Paper on European Social Policy indicates that perhaps 
it has.161  
  The ETUC's 1995 Brussels Congress was an operation of consolidating earlier changes. The 
ETUC and its constituents are now somewhat better able to face Europe, than they were in 1985. In 
large part this is a consequence of efforts by European institutions. occur. Whether ETUC and other 
unions are sufficiently well prepared, and whether the European context will remain sufficiently 
welcoming to their future efforts, remains to be seen. But there has turned out to be a sting in the tail of 
our story.   
  A benevolently disposed European Commission  has clearly tried to help create Euro-level trade 
unionism. But this Commission has always had its own purposes and interests in doing so.  Making  
breakthroughs on social policy and industrial relations matters and reconfiguring European "social 
partners" into genuine bargainers were important on their own, to be sure, but they were also designed 
to persuade European labor to buy into the Commission's particular plans for European unification.  
These plans and labor's needs no longer coincide as clearly as they once did, however.  Continuing to 
buy buy into the Commission's goals has become very costly.  The most important immediate goals is 
the finalization of Economic and Monetary Union. EMU stage three, when the European System of 
Central Banks is established and movement towards a single currency becomes ineluctable, is 
scheduled to begin in 1999.  During the five years since Maastricht the ETUC has stood behind EMU 
plans, if sometimes arguing about details. This position has become damaging. The convergence 
criteria of Maastricht and the subordination of EMU monetary policy to German stress on strict price 
stability  are now inimical to labor's interests in terms of unemployment and stagnated living standards.  
ETUC and its constituents, nursed by European institutions to Europeanize, now must wean 
themselves away.  
 